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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
SHAWN R. KEITH, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
CaseNo.20040328-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from a judgement, sentence, stay of execution of sentence, 
order of probation and commitment which was the result of a plea of "no contest" in the 
above matter of the offense of driving under the influence of alcohol §41-6-44 (1953 as 
Amended) a class a misdemeanor, in the fifth judicial district court, in and for iron 
county, state of Utah, the Honorable Judge Eves, presiding. This Court has jurisdiction 
pursuant to the "pour-over" provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 2002). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Whether or not trial court erred in denying Appellant's motion to 
suppress after finding that the State of Utah had not complied with the 
requirements of Utah Code Annotated, Section 41-6-44.3 (2002) and Rule 
714-500-6 of the Utah Administrative Code? 
In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, the Court of Appeals will not 
disturb the trial court's finding of fact unless the trial court is "clearly erroneous." State 
v. Naisbitt, 827 P.2d 969, 971 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). Nevertheless, the question of 
whether a statute prevents the admission of evidence depends on a trial court's 
interpretation and the "trial court' 's interpretation of a statute presents a question of law." 
Ward v. Richfield City, 798 P.2d 757,759 (Utah 1990). A lower court's statutory 
interpretation is given no particular deference and is assessed for correctness as are all 
questions of law. State ex rel Div of Consumer Protection v. Rio Vista Oil Ltd., 786 P.2d 
1214 (Utah App. 1991). When construing legislative enactments, the primary 
responsibility of the reviewing court "is to give effect to the legislature's underlying 
intent." Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314, 1317 (Utah 1983). 
2. Whether or not trial court erred in Ruling Proper Foundation Was Presented For 
Breath Test To Be Admissible Despite Lack of Presumption Afforded Pursuant to 
Compliance With 41-6-44.3 (2002). 
"A trial court has discretion in determining whether a witness has adequate 
qualifications to testify as an expert and in determining whether specific testimony 
offered by an expert should be allowed or whether said testimony exceeds the expert's 
qualifications." Wessel v. Erickson Landscaping Co., 711 P.2d 250, 253 (Utah 1985). 
Absent an abuse of discretion by a trial court, an appellate court is not to disturb said 
determination. Lamb v. Bangart, 525 P.2d 602, 607-08 (Utah 1974). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following statutes are relevant to this appeal: 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Utah 1953, as amended); 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.3 (Utah 1953, as amended); 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.3 (Supp 2002); 
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Rule 714-500-6 of the Utah Administrative Code; 
Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State of Utah concurs with the Statement of the Case as has been presented by 
the Appellant with the exception that in March 2003, after an evidentiary hearing the trial 
court not only determined that the Intoxilyzer 5000 test results were admissible upon the 
showing that the Intoxilyzer 5000 was operating properly, but also upon findings 
regarding the operating officer's training and experience, prior certification to operate the 
Intoxilyzer 5000 and two subsequent re-certifications. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The State of Utah concurs with the Statement of the Facts as has been presented by 
the Appellant. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
U.C.A.§ 41-6-44.3 (2002) dictates that when the Department of Public Safety's 
administrative rules are not complied with, only the presumption of the admissibility of 
the chemical breath test is lost, not the potential for having it admitted via other means. 
In the event that U.C.A.§ 41-6-44.3 is not complied with, the trial court must make a 
determination that the Intoxilyzer 5000 machine was properly maintained and functioning 
properly on the date in question and that the person administering the breath test was 
competent pursuant to Utah Rule of Evidence 702. The legislative intent was not to rest 
the role of admission of breath test evidence solely upon U.C.A.§ 41-6-44.3 but to make 
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the admission of this highly accepted evidence more manageable for the government and 
the courts. 
ARGUMENTS 
1. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING APPELLANT'S 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS BREATHALYZER RESULTS 
The trial did not err in denying appellant's motion to suppress the results of the 
Intoxilyzer 5000 test taken subsequent to his arrest for driving under the influence of 
alcohol. Because the arresting officer's certification had lapsed, the Intoxilyzer 5000 
results were not presumed admissible as contemplated by U.C.A. 44-6-44.3 (2002), but 
were correctly deemed admissible after careful analysis and application of Utah Rule of 
Evidence 702. Because the trial court made a determination that the Intoxilyzer 5000 
machine was properly maintained and functioning properly on the date in question and 
that the person administering the breath test was competent, proper foundation was 
presented pursuant to Utah Rule of Evidence 702. 
The question of whether a statute prevents the admission of evidence depends on a 
trial court's interpretation and the "trial court's interpretation of a statute presents a 
question of law." Ward v. Richfield City at 759. A lower court's statutory interpretation 
"is given no particular deference" and is assessed for correctness as are all questions of 
law. State ex rel Div of Consumer Protection v. Rio Vista Oil Ltd. at 1347. When 
construing legislative enactments, the primary responsibility of the reviewing court "is to 
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give effect to the legislature's underlying intent." Murray City v. Hall at 1317 (Utah 
1983). "A trial court has discretion in determining whether a witness has adequate 
qualifications to testify as an expert and in determining whether specific testimony 
offered by an expert should be allowed or whether said testimony exceeds the expert's 
qualifications." Wessel v. Erickson Landscaping Co,, at 253. Absent an abuse of 
discretion by a trial court, an appellate court is not to disturb said determination. Lamb v. 
Bangart at 607-08. 
A. Compliance With Utah Code Annotated § 44-6-44.3 (2000) Merely 
Provides Presumption of Admissibility and Validity of Breath Test 
Evidence And Any Deviations From Standards Established by 
Department of Public Safety Requires Prosecution to Present Proper 
Foundation and Validity of Evidence For Admission of Evidence. 
Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-44.3 provides: 
41-6-44.3 STANDARDS FOR CHEMICAL BREATH TEST - EVIDENCE. 
(1) The Commissioner of the Department of Public Safety shall establish 
standards for the administration and interpretation of chemical analysis of a 
person's breath, including standards of training. 
(2) In any action or proceeding in which it is material to prove that a person 
was operating or in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the 
influence of alcohol or any drug or operating with a blood or breath alcohol 
content statutorily prohibited, documents offered as memoranda or records 
of acts, conditions, or events to prove that the analysis was made and that 
the instrument was accurate, according to standards established in 
subsection (1), are admissible if: 
(a) the judge finds that they were made in the regular course of the 
investigation at or about the time of the act, condition or event; and 
(b) the source of information from which made and method and 
circumstances of their preparation indicate their trustworthiness. 
(3). If the judge finds that the standards under section (1) and the 
conditions of subsection (2) have been met, there is presumption that the 
test results are valid and further foundation for introduction of the evidence 
is unnecessary, (emphasis added). 
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Section 41-6-44.3 of the Utah Code Annotated are requirements that the Utah State 
Legislature created, which when fully complied with, create a presumption of validity of 
an Intoxilyzer 5000's results as to the blood alcohol level of an alleged drunken driver and 
establishes the foundation of said evidence. The commissioner of the Department of 
Public Safety pursuant to 41-6-44.3(1) has promulgated "standards for the administration 
and interpretation of chemical analysis of a person's breath, including standards of 
training." The administrative rule at issue presently, Rule 714-500-6 of the Utah 
Administrative Code, provides as follows: 
R 714-500-6. Operator Certification 
A. All breath alcohol testing operators, hereinafter "operators" must be 
certified by the department. 
B. All training for initial and renewal certification will be conducted by a 
program supervisor and/or technician. 
C. Initial Certification 
(1) in order to apply for certification as an operator of a breath testing 
instrument, an applicant must successfully complete a course of instruction 
approved by the department, which must include as a minimum the 
following: 
a. One hour of instruction on the effects of alcohol in the human body. 
b. Two hours of instruction on the operational principles of breath testing. 
c. On hour of instruction on the D.U.L Summons and Citations/D.U.I. 
Report forms. 
d. One and one half hours of instruction on the legal aspects of chemical 
testing, driving under the influence, case law and other alcohol related laws. 
e. One and one half hours of laboratory participation performing simulated 
tests on the instruments, including demonstrations under the supervision of 
a class instructor. 
f. One hour for examination and critic of course. 
(2) After successful completion of the initial certification course a 
certificate will be issued that will be valid for two years. 
D. Renewal Certification 
(1) the operator is required to renew certification prior to its expiration date. 
The minimum requirement for renewal of operator certification will be: 
6 
a. To hours of instruction on the effects of alcohol on the human body. 
b. Two hours of instruction on the operational principles of breath testing. 
c. One hour of instruction on the D.U.I. Summons and Citations/D.U.I. 
Report Form and Testimony of Arresting Officer. 
d. Two hours of instruction on the legal aspects of chemical testing and 
detecting the drinking driver. 
e. One hour of examination and critic of course. 
f. Or the operator must successfully complete the compact disk computer 
program including successful completion of exam. Result of exams must 
be forwarded to the program supervisor and a certification certificate will 
be issued. 
(2) Any operator who allows his certification to expire one year or longer 
must retake and successfully complete the initial certification course as 
outlined in paragraph C of this section. 
Fifth District Court Judge J. Philip Eves correctly determined that § 41-6-44.3 
dictates that when the Department of Public Safety's administrative rules are not 
complied with, only the presumption of the admissibility of the chemical breath test is 
lost, not the potential for having it admitted via other means. 
In Salt Lake City v. Emerson, 861 P.2d 443 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), the defendant 
was involved in a traffic accident and was later taken into custody for suspicion of driving 
under the influence of alcohol. The arresting officer administered the breath test on the 
defendant. The defendant failed to blow properly into the mouthpiece on two different 
occasions forcing the officer to administer the test a third time which proved to finally be 
enough for a proper analysis. It was determined however that the officer had failed to 
complete a written checklist for each of the three attempts, nor did he keep the record 
cards from the two initial invalid tests. The defendant filed a motion to suppress the third 
reading arguing that the officer's failure to complete a separate checklists for the third 
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breath test violated the Department of Public Safety standards, which was denied by the 
trial court. The defendant was subsequently convicted of driving under the influence of 
alcohol. On appeal the very issue was raised to the Utah Court of Appeals. To that issue, 
the appellate court ruled the "defendant provided no evidence to the contrary" (that the 
officer followed the necessary steps on the written checklist for operating the Intoxilyzer 
5000) and the "failure to generate a separate checklist form for each test attempt does not 
violate the standards promulgated by the Department of Public Safety." Id. at 447. 
Further, the court rejected the notion that suppression was the absolute outcome if the 
failure to complete the checklist had been determined to be a violation of the 
administrative rules. "We reject defendant's argument that any deviation from the 
standards established by the Department of Public Safety should result in outright 
suppression of the test results under section 44-6-44.3. While full compliance with the 
standards, coupled with a finding as to the additional safeguards described in the statute, 
creates a presumption of validity and establishes the evidence's foundation, failure to 
fully comply with such standards does not necessarily destroy the admissibility of the 
breath test evidence. It simply means that the foundation and validity of the evidence 
may not be presumed, but rather that they will have to be established in order for the 
evidence to be admitted." Id. at 447. 
The Utah Court of Appeals in State v. Garcia, 965 P.2d 508, (Utah Ct. App. 1998), 
a similarly natured case ruled that, unlike aforementioned Emerson, the rules promulgated 
by the Utah Department of Public Safety had in fact been violated, yet the prosecution did 
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not lose the potential for the admissibility of the breath test evidence. Because the Utah 
Highway Patrol failed to comply with the Department of Public Safety Rule of 
Administration 714-500 by incorrectly failing to record the numerical results of reference 
sample tests, the court ruled, the prosecution could not be extended the statutory 
presumption afforded by 44-6-44.3. Despite this setback for the prosecution in Garcia, 
the court went on to rule that the conclusion that the Department of Public Safety rules 
were not followed does not mean that the breath evidence had to be wholly excluded. 
"Section 41-6-44.3," the court held, "merely defines those conditions under which a 
prosecutor may invoke rebuttable presumption that breath test evidence is accurate and 
reliable. If the conditions are not met, the statutory presumption is not available. The 
statute reaches no further." Id at 515. The Garcia court, comparing it's ruling with that 
of various other ruling in other jurisdictions throughout the country noted that, similar to 
said other courts, it's holding stands for the notion that "if a violation seriously 
undermines the accuracy of the instrument or a defendant's test result, the State will not 
be able to establish the foundation necessary" for admission of the defendant's test. Id. at 
515. 
The Court of Appeals in Arizona considered a scenario very similar to the present 
issue before the court in State v. Superior Court, 991 P.2d 258 (Ariz. App. Div. 1 1999). 
The arresting officer did not have the requisite certification for a modified Intoxilyzer 
5000 machine used to test the breath of a group of defendant who had been arrested under 
suspicion of driving under the influence of alcohol. Unlike the rulings in Emerson and 
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Garcia, the breath test evidence was suppressed by the trial court. Similar to the 
aforementioned Utah administrative rules, Arizona has promulgated foundational 
prerequisites for the presumption at issue in the present matter. Much like the facts of the 
present matter, the officer in Arizona was in violation of said administrative rules due to 
the lack of certification for the modified Intoxilyzer 5000 machine. Like the rulings in 
Emerson and Garcia, the Arizona appellate court ruled that, at the very least, the 
prosecutorial entity should have been "allowed to offer evidence to test its theory of 
admissibility." Id. at 261. The court also indicated that although "assuming that the 
results of the breath tests were inadmissible because the State was unable to meet the 
statutory foundational prerequisites, and assuming that the State could lay the proper 
foundation, the results could still be admissible via the scientific method and the Arizona 
Rules of Evidence." Id. at 261. 
Turning to the present, there is no dispute that Officer Guyman, the arresting 
officer had followed the requisite steps to become a certified operator of the Intoxilyzer 
5000 and that he had allowed said certification, which required additional training, 
involving seven hours of training to be followed by an examination period, or in the 
alternative, a computerized course, to lapse, clearly in violation of the administrative rules 
promulgated by the Department of Public Safety. However, Fifth District Court Judge J. 
Philip Eves correctly interpreted § 41-6-44.3 to dictate that when the Department of 
Public Safety's administrative rules are not complied with, only the presumption of the 
admissibility of the chemical breath test is lost, not the potential for having it admitted via 
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other means. The Emerson court clearly directs the current question before this court in 
that the "failure to fully comply with such standards does not necessarily destroy the 
admissibility of the breath test evidence. It simply means that the foundation and validity 
of the evidence may not be presumed, but rather that they will have to be established in 
order for the evidence to be admitted." Emerson at 445. Garcia gives the same guidance. 
Judge Eve's reasoning simply follows the rulings handed down by this very court in 
Emerson and Garcia, requiring that the State, as §41-6-44.3 was not complied with, in 
order to present the breath test evidence was required to qualify the officer as an expert 
and to show that the test was properly administered. 
Thus, the trial court correctly relied on Garcia and it's own statutory interpretation 
of §41-6-44.3, dismissing the defendant's motion to suppress the breath test evidence. 
B. Legislative Intent Mandates That Prosecution Be Able to Attempt to 
Lay Foundation and Present as Evidence the Intoxilyzer 5000 Results 
Despite Non-compliance with § 41-6-44.3. 
Utah Code Annotated 41-6-44.3 (3) 
(3). If the judge finds that the standards under section (1) and the conditions of 
subsection (2) have been met, there is presumption that the test results are valid 
and further foundation for introduction of the evidence is unnecessary, (emphasis 
added). 
In Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314 (Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme Court 
discussed U.C.A. § 41-6-44.3 and the apparent intent of the legislature in its' creation. 
"Section 41-6-44.3 is merely a codification of the findings necessary to establish proper 
foundation for the introduction of breathalyzer evidence. It is a legislative recognition of 
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the universal acceptance of the reliability of such evidence." Additionally, "[t]he 
enactment of U.C.A. § 41-6-44.3 evinces an intent by the Legislature to relieve the State 
of Utah and other governmental entities of the financial burden of calling as a witness in 
every DUI case the public officer responsible for testing the accuracy of the breathalyzer 
equipment." Id. at 1320. 
The Utah Supreme Court's interpretation of U.C.A. § 41-6-44.3 in Murray City v. 
Hall does not indicate that the foundational hurdles necessary to overcome by the 
governmental agency in order to introduce breath test evidence is wholly eliminated due 
to said legislation. Rather, it appears to be, in a sense, a shortcut that has been codified 
because of the "universal acceptance of the reliability" of the evidence involved. In other 
words, it was not the legislatures intent to make U.C.A. § 41-6-44.3 and compliance 
thereto the only means for the introduction of breath test evidence but a quicker more 
efficient means to said end. This is evidenced by the language, "[i]f a judge finds the 
standards...and conditions...have been met, there is a presumption...and further foundation 
for the introduction of evidence is unnecessary." U.C.A. 41-6-44.3(3). If the legislative 
intent were to shut the door on other means of having the breath test evidence admitted 
into evidence then the language would have indicated such an intent. That language is 
missing. 
2. 
PROPER FOUNDATION WAS PRESENTED FOR BREATH TEST TO BE 
ADMISSIBLE DESPITE LACK OF PRESUMPTION AFFORDED PURSUANT 
TO COMPLIANCE WITH 41-6-44.3. 
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Utah Rule of Evidence 702 provides that "[i]f scientific, technical, or other 
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to 
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or 
otherwise." Utah R. Evid. 702. Admissibility under rule 702 hinges on "whether... the 
evidence will be helpful to the finder of fact.1" State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1361 
(Utah 1993) (quoting State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388, 398 n.8 (1989)). An expert 
may testify regarding scientific methods that have "'attained general acceptance i n . . . 
the relevant scientific community,1" the additional Rimmasch test does not apply. Id. at 
22 (alteration in original) (quoting Patey v. Lainhart, 1999 UT 31, 16, 977 P.2d 1193). 
Formal training or education is not a prerequisite to giving expert opinion, and 
witnesses may qualify as an expert by virtue of experience and training. Randle v. 
Allen, 862 P.2d 1329, 1337 (Utah 1993). See also, Wessel v. Erickson Landscaping 
Co., 711 P.2d 250, 253 (Utah 1985) and State v. Eldredge, 113 P.2d 29, 37 (Utah 
1989). 
On March 10, 2003, an evidentiary hearing was held before J. Philip Eves, Fifth 
District Court, the principal issue before the Court was whether or not the State of Utah 
could present sufficient foundation to allow the admissibility of the intoxilyzer results 
that were administered on June 23, 2002. The Court heard the testimony of Mr. Dan 
Guymon of the Cedar City Police Department who was the operator of the Intoxilyzer 
5000 and Mr. Gaylin Moore of the Utah Highway Patrol who is the certified tester of 
the Intoxilyzer 5000. Having heard the testimony from the witnesses and arguments 
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from the parties, the court deemed that the breath test evidence would be admissible at 
trial making the following findings of fact and conclusions of law1: 
1. The Court finds that Officer Dan Guymon has been a peace officer for 
approximately five years and that during that time, Officer Guymon has undertaken 
training related to the proper operation of the Intoxilyzer 5000. The Court finds that 
Officer Guymon was initially certified, and thereafter, has been certified twice. The 
second certification having been completed after June 23, 2002. 
2. The Court finds that at the time that the intoxilyzer test was administered, on 
Mr. Shawn Keith, Officer Guymon's certification had lapsed by eight months. 
3. The Court finds that Gaylin Moore is a certified operator of the Intoxilyzer 
5000, and that he is an instructor in the use of the Intoxilyzer 5000, and that he is a 
certified tester of the Intoxilyzer 5000 machine. The Court finds Trooper Moore has 
extensive knowledge and expertise in the use, function, and capabilities of the 
Intoxilyzer 5000 machine. The Court finds that Trooper Moore has conducted 
hundreds of tests on the Intoxilyzer 5000 including approximately one hundred and 
fifty tests per month. The Court finds that the Intoxilyzer 5000 is not a difficult 
machine to operate. The Court further finds, based on the testimony of Trooper Moore, 
that the intoxilyzer test conducted on June 23,2002, on the Defendant was conducted 
properly. The Court further finds, by the stipulation of the parties, that the Intoxilyzer 
5000 was property functioning on June 23, 2002. 
4. The Court is convinced that the intoxilyzer results conducted on June 23, 
2002, is an accurate measure of the Defendant's breath alcohol content and that is does 
not show the result of mouth alcohol content. This finding is supported by the 
evidence as produced through Trooper Moore that the Intoxilyzer 5000 is capable of 
detecting spikes that result from mouth alcohol content, as opposed to steady alcohol 
readings which result from breath alcohol content. 
The Court finds that Officer Dan Guymon did comply with the "Baker Rule." 
The Court finds that at the time of the Defendant's arrest, at the scene of the crime, that 
the Defendant's mouth was checked. At approximately the same time, the Defendant 
was allowed to smoke a cigarette or chew tobacco. The Court finds that more than one 
half hour passed after the Defendant smoked a cigarette or consumed the tobacco to the 
time that the intoxilyzer test was completed. The Court finds that after the Defendant 
smoked the cigarette or consumed the tobacco, that the officer did not see the 
Defendant place anything within his mouth. The evidence, as presented through 
Trooper Moore, indicates that tobacco smoke or chewing tobacco would not increase 
the Defendant's test result on the Intoxilyzer 5000. 
(See hearing transcript of March 10th, 2003, at pages 62-64; See also Record at page 
168.) 
*See the hearing transcript of March 10th, 2003, at pages 62-64; See also Record at 
page 168. 
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Based on the findings made by the court it is easy to see why the breath test 
evidence was admitted. Officer Guymon had a sizeable amount of experience and had 
been certified to operate the Intoxilyzer 5000 and had been re-certified on two prior 
occasions. Also, Gaylin Moore, the certified officer whose duties include the 
maintenance and certification of the particular Intoxilyzer 5000 in question, and whose 
experience in operating, testing and maintaining said devices is quite extensive, 
testified that the device was functioning properly on the night in question and that 
officer Guymon used the device properly. As the appellant states in his brief to this 
court, there is no question the trial court in this case was quite aware of the 702 
requirements, and that based upon its findings, scrutinized the qualifications of both of 
the law enforcement officers, the administration of the test at issue and the testimony 
regarding the functionality of the machine. Additionally, it was stipulated at the 
hearing that the Intolilyzer 5000 was working properly when conducted on June 23, 
2002. 
Appellant makes the argument that allowing the breath test evidence in as an 
alternative basis for establishing reliability without an operator's certification through 
the established standards eliminates the necessity to ever become certified. This is not 
so. It is not in the State's interest to remove the presumption that § 41-6-44.3 affords. 
The time and monetary resources spent in conducting hearings to determine the 
evidentiary issues would be overwhelming and would go contrary to the intent of the 
legislature. (See Murray City v. Hall at 1321). Further, it is apparent from the finding 
made by Judge Eves that the fact that Officer Guyman had been certified and then 
certified again on two subsequent occasions played a role in making a finding that the 
evidence was admissible. Said certification and re-certification reflects training and 
experience.and goes towards the officer's ability to use the Intoxilyzer 5000 correctly. 
15 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State asks this Court to affirm the trial court's 
order. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED [_ March 2005. 
iFFERY E. SLACK 
Deouty Iron County Attorney 
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